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Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994 – July 2018 
 
Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley
August 23, 2018 
 
We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission since 1994.  This revised listing includes 58 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through 
July 2018.  It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency 
concerns.  This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical 
Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016). 
 
 
  
Year Case Description 
Vertical 
Theory of 
Harm 
Remedy 
2018 United States v. 
CRH plc1 
CRH proposed to acquire the Pounding Mill Quarry 
Corporation. Together, CRH and Pounding Mill owned 
nearly all the aggregates quarries suitable for highway 
construction in West Virginia. In addition, CRH was one of 
only two suppliers of asphalt concrete, to which aggregates 
are an input, in West Virginia. The other producer of asphalt 
concrete sourced its aggregates from Pounding Mill. The 
DOJ alleged that the merger would give CRH the incentive 
to raise the price of or deny access to aggregates for that 
asphalt concrete competitor. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required CRH to 
divest one of Pounding Mill’s quarries. 
 In re Northrop 
Grumman 
Corporation2 
Northrop Grumman proposed to acquire Orbital ATK. 
Northrop Grumman was one of four competitors capable of 
supplying the US government with missile systems. Orbital 
ATK was the premier supplier or solid rocket motors, which 
are a component of missile systems. The FTC alleged that 
the merger would have given Northrop Grumman the 
incentive to raise the price of or deny access to Orbital’s 
solid rock motors to other missile system competitors. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required Northrop 
Grumman to separate its solid rocket 
motor business from the rest of the 
company with a firewall and for the 
Department of Defense to appoint a 
compliance officer to oversee the 
decree. 
 United States v. 
Bayer AG3 
Bayer proposed to acquire Monsanto. Monsanto has a 
dominant position in the seed market and Bayer has a 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required Bayer to 
divest its canola, soybean, and 
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Year Case Description 
Vertical 
Theory of 
Harm 
Remedy 
dominant position in the seed treatments market, which is a 
key input for genetically modified seeds. The DOJ alleged 
that the merger would give Bayer an incentive to charge a 
higher price for seed treatments to Monsanto’s rivals.  
vegetable seed business and certain 
seed treatments. It must also divest 
certain intellectual property and 
research capabilities.  
2017 
 
United States v. 
AT&T Inc.4 
AT&T proposed to acquire Time Warner for $85 billion. 
AT&T is the largest distributor of subscription television, 
through its subsidiary DirecTV. Time Warner owns several 
TV networks such as TNT, TBS, CNN, and HBO. The DOJ 
alleged that the merger would give AT&T an incentive to 
coordinate with Comcast to charge other distributors more to 
provide Time Warner channels, because in the event that 
bargaining failed some customers of other distributors would 
switch to DirecTV. The DOJ alleged that the market was 
conducive to coordination because both Comcast and 
AT&T-Time Warner want to slow the growing popularity of  
multichannel online video services.  
Unilateral and 
coordinated 
input 
foreclosure 
Following a loss at trial, the court’s 
final judgment approved the merger 
without any restrictions.  
 In re Broadcom 
Ltd.5 
Broadcom proposed to acquire Brocade Communication 
Systems. Brocade manufactures fibre switches. Brocade 
and Cisco are the only two competitors in the worldwide 
market for fibre switches. Broadcom supplies both 
companies with application specific integrated circuits to 
Misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information  
Consent Decree required Broadcom to 
implement firewalls preventing flow of 
Cisco’s confidential information to 
Brocade. 
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Year Case Description 
Vertical 
Theory of 
Harm 
Remedy 
make these switches. The FTC alleged that the merger 
would give Broadcom the ability to share Cisco’s confidential 
information with Brocade to preempt Cisco’s competitive 
moves and thus raise the prices for fibre channel switches.   
 United States v. 
Danone S.A.6 
Danone proposed to acquire WhiteWave. Danone is a 
leading manufacturer of organic yogurt through its Stonyfield 
brand. WhiteWave is a manufacturer of fluid organic milk. 
Prior to this merger, Danone developed a close relationship 
to CROPP, another manufacturer of fluid organic milk, under 
which CROPP provided Danone with 90% of its fluid organic 
milk needs. CROPP also licensed Danone’s Stonyfield 
brand to sell fluid organic milk.  The DOJ alleged that the 
merger and the close relationship between CROPP and 
Danone would give CROPP and WhiteWave an incentive to 
coordinate and exchange confidential information to raise 
the price of fluid organic milk because CROPP could not 
easily sever its Supply and License Agreements with 
Danone.  
Buy-side 
coordination 
through 
information 
exchange  
Consent Decree required Danone to 
divest its Stonyfield brand to a 
competitor approved by the United 
States because this severed the 
Supply and License Agreements 
between Danone and CROPP.  
 2016 
  
United States 
v. Lam 
Research 
Corp.7   
Lam Research Corp. is a provider of “etch, deposition, 
and clean” tools and process technology used for the 
fabrication of semiconductors. KLA-Tencor is a supplier of 
metrology and inspection equipment for semiconductors. 
Input 
foreclosure 
 Transaction abandoned. 
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Year Case Description 
Vertical 
Theory of 
Harm 
Remedy 
KLA-Tencor’s technology is used to review the 
semiconductor to ensure it is not defective, while Lam’s 
technology helps create the semiconductor.  Lam 
proposed to acquire KLA-Tencor for $10.6 billion. The 
DOJ alleged that Lam’s control of KLA-Tenor would allow 
Lam to foreclose its fabrication competitors by reducing 
timely access to KLA-Tencor inspection equipment and 
related critical services for the production of 
semiconductors. 
 United 
States v. 
Anheuser-
Busch InBev 
(SABMiller)8 
Anheuser-Busch (ABI) proposed to acquire SABMiller for 
$107 billion. ABI owns and operates more than 40 major 
beer brands in the United States; SABMiller, through 
MillerCoors, owns and operates 12 breweries in the 
United States, and also has more than 40 major beer 
brands. As a result of the acquisition, ABI would gain a 
majority interest in MillerCoors. The DOJ alleged that the 
merger would increase ABI’s “incentive and ability to 
disadvantage its remaining rivals by limiting or impeding 
the distribution of their beers[.]”  
Input 
foreclosure  
While the concern was primarily 
horizontal (and the Consent decree 
requires ABI to divest SABMiller’s 
entire U.S. business, including 
ownership interest in MillerCoors), 
there was also a vertical element.  
The Consent Decree) prohibits ABI 
from “instituting and continuing 
practices and programs that limit 
the ability and incentives of 
independent beer distributors to 
sell and promote the beers of ABI’s 
rivals.” These practices typically 
include incentives for distributors to 
sell exclusively or near exclusively 
ABI beers.   
 United 
States v. 
AMC 
AMC Entertainment Holdings proposed to acquire 
Carmike Cinemas. Both are significant competitors in the 
exhibition of first-run commercial movies in fifteen local 
Customer 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
Consent decree required AMC to 
divest from movie theaters in 
overlapping local markets, and to 
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Vertical 
Theory of 
Harm 
Remedy 
Entertainme
nt Holdings 
Inc. 9 
markets in the United States. AMC is also a founding 
member of National CineMedia – a pre-show services 
provider – while Carmike is one of the largest investors 
in NCM’s competitor, Screenvision. The DOJ alleged 
that the new AMC would reduce Carmicke’s incentive to 
purchase from Screenvision, “resulting in less 
aggressive competition [between Screenvision and 
NCM] to gain exhibitors and advertisers at the expense 
of the other.”   
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
sell off most of its holdings, 
relinquish all governance rights in 
NCM, and transfer 24 theatres to 
the Screenvision network. AMC is 
also required to establish firewalls 
to ensure that it does not obtain 
NCM’s, Screenvision’s, or other 
movie exhibitors’ sensitive 
information.  
2015 In re Par 
Petroleum 
Corporation 
and Mid Pac 
Petroleum 
LLC.10 
Par Petroleum Corporation (“Par”), a diversified energy 
company that owned the Kapolei refinery on Oahu and 
wholesale and retail distribution assets in Hawaii, 
proposed to acquire the Koko’oha subsidiary of Mid Pac 
Petroleum LLC, a bulk supplier and distributor of 
petroleum products in Hawaii. The FTC alleged that the 
acquisition would give Par an incentive to deny 
Koko’oha’s petroleum storage space rights at the Barbers 
Point Terminal to Par’s competitor, Aloha, reducing 
Aloha’s ability to credibly threaten to import refined 
petroleum. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required Par to 
terminate its rights at the Barbers 
Point Terminal, other than for a 
limited number of tanker trucks. 
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 Comcast 
Co., Time 
Warner 
Cable Inc.11 
Comcast, the largest video and wired broadband 
internet-access provider in the United States, proposed 
to acquire Time Warner Cable, the fourth largest video 
and third largest wired broadband internet-access 
provider in the United States, for approximately $45.2 
billion. The DOJ cited concerns that the merger “would 
make Comcast an unavoidable gatekeeper for internet-
based services [including those that compete with 
Comcast and Time Warner Cable services] that rely on 
a broadband connect to reach consumers.” Comcast, 
having obtained sole ownership of NBCUniversal in 
2013, would also be incentivized to foreclose internet 
and broadband access to NBC competitors, as well as 
deny carriage of NBC competitors.  
Input and 
customer 
foreclosure 
Transaction abandoned.  
2014 In re Nielsen 
Holdings 
N.V.12 
Nielsen Holdings N.V., a leading global media 
measurement and research company that provided 
television, online, mobile, and cross-platform 
measurement services, proposed to acquire Arbitron Inc., 
a media measurement and research company 
specializing in radio data. The FTC alleged that the 
merger eliminated potential competition in the “future 
market” of hybrid, cross-platform media data, because the 
two companies were in the best position to develop these 
new these new services. 
Merging 
firms as 
potential 
entrants; 
merging 
firms as entry 
facilitators 
Consent Decree required Nielsen 
(1) to divest Arbitron’s 
in-development cross-platform 
audience measurement business; 
and (2) to perpetually license 
current and the next eight years of 
data from Arbitron’s measurement 
panel to the buyer. 
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2013 In re General 
Electric Co.13 
General Electric Co. (“GE”) proposed to acquire the 
aviation business of Avio S.p.A., which designed and 
manufactured component parts for aircraft engines, 
including parts used in Pratt & Whitney’s engine for the 
Airbus A320neo. Through a joint venture, GE 
manufactured the only other competing engine option for 
the A320neo. The FTC alleged that GE could disrupt the 
design and certification of the Avio-supplied parts for the 
Pratt & Whitney engine to favor the competitive position of 
GE’s own engine. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree incorporated 
portions of the original contract 
between Avio and Pratt & Whitney 
regarding the agreement to develop 
the engine components and 
restricted GE from interfering with 
the Avio team working on the 
project. 
2012 United States 
v. United 
Technologies 
Corp.14 
UTC, which manufactured aircraft turbine engines, 
proposed to acquire Goodrich Corporation (“Goodrich”), 
which manufactured electronic control systems (“ECS”) 
for aircraft turbine engines through a joint venture with 
Rolls-Royce, and held the exclusive rights to supply 
components to that joint venture. The DOJ alleged that 
the merger would give UTC an incentive and ability to 
withhold ECSs from or to increase the cost of components 
for ECSs to Rolls-Royce, with which UTC competed to 
supply aircraft turbine engines. Additionally, the DOJ 
alleged that UTC could gain access to competitively 
sensitive information about Rolls-Royce’s aircraft turbine 
engines through the information necessary to 
manufacture ECSs for those engines. Finally, the DOJ 
alleged similar concerns with respect to competition in 
small aircraft turbine engines, for which Goodrich supplied 
UTC’s competitors with ECSs. The DOJ also alleged 
horizontal theories of harm in other markets. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Final Judgment required UTC to 
divest to Rolls-Royce all of 
Goodrich’s shares in its ECS joint 
venture, and to provide Rolls-Royce 
an option to acquire Goodrich assets 
related to the aftermarket for the 
joint venture’s ECS products. The 
Final Judgment also required UTC to 
provide various supply and transition 
services agreements to the 
acquirers of the assets being 
divested.  
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2011 United States 
v. Comcast 
Corp.15 
Comcast Corp., General Electric Co. (“GE”), NBC, and 
Navy, LLC formed a joint venture of broadcast and cable 
network assets. Comcast, the largest cable provider, 
would have majority control of the JV containing NBC’s 
popular video programming. The DOJ and FCC alleged 
the combined entity could withhold or raise the price of 
NBC content to Comcast’s rival multichannel video 
programming distributors (“MPVDs”) or online video 
programming distributors (“OVDs”) to reduce their ability 
to compete with Comcast, as Comcast had done in the 
past with its RSN network. Additionally, Comcast could 
refuse to carry competitor channels of NBC to reduce their 
ability to compete against NBC. The DOJ rejected claims 
that the transaction would eliminate double 
marginalization as not, or at least not entirely, merger 
specific because the industry had already successfully 
done so through contracts with non-linear pricing. 
Input and 
Customer 
foreclosure 
Final Judgment required the JV (1) 
to license its broadcast, cable, and 
film content to OVDs on terms 
comparable to those on which it 
licensed to MVPDs and to those the 
OVD received from a competitor of 
the JV; (2) to relinquish its voting 
rights in the Hulu joint venture (an 
OVD); (3) to not use certain 
restrictive license terms with OVDs; 
(4) to not unreasonably discriminate 
in the transmission of lawful content 
through its internet service, including 
by exempting its own services from 
data caps; and (5) to supply MVPDs 
with the JV’s programming content 
and submit to binding arbitration 
over the license terms. 
 United States 
v. GrafTech 
International 
Ltd16 
GrafTech International Ltd., a manufacturer of graphite 
electrodes, proposed to acquire Seadrift Coke L.P., a 
manufacturer of petroleum needle coke, a key input in the 
graphite electrodes. The DOJ alleged it would provide 
Seadrift with direct access to competitors’ pricing and 
product information through GrafTech’s supply 
agreements and most–favored-nation provisions with 
Seadrift’s competitors, particularly Conoco Phillips Co., 
ultimately facilitating the collusive exchange of 
information. 
Collusive 
information 
exchanges 
Final Judgment required the 
combined entity (1) to amend its 
supply agreement to competitor 
Conoco to remove ongoing audit 
rights, sharing of confidential 
information, and MFN pricing; (2) to 
not enter into similar terms with 
Conoco for ten years; and (3) to 
firewall personnel deciding Seadrift’s 
pricing and production from 
Conoco’s competitively sensitive 
information. 
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 United States 
v. Google 
Inc.17 
Google Inc. proposed to acquire ITA Software Inc., the 
developer and licenser of QPX software, which was used 
by airlines, travel agents, and online travel intermediaries 
(“OTIs”) to provide customized flight searches. Google 
intended to offer an online travel search that would 
compete with OTIs, many of which used QPX. The DOJ 
alleged that Google could deny OTIs access to or raise 
their price for QPX software. Additionally, the DOJ alleged 
that Google could gain access to competitively sensitive 
information from OTIs, such as tuning parameters and 
plans for new services. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Final Judgment required Google (1) 
to honor existing QPX licenses; (2) 
to renew existing licenses under 
similar terms and conditions; (3) to 
offer licenses to other online travel 
intermediaries on reasonable, 
non-discriminatory terms and submit 
to binding arbitration over those 
terms; (4) to devote substantially the 
same amount of resources to R&D 
for QPX as ITA did before the 
merger; (5) to not use certain 
restrictive terms in its agreements 
with airlines and OTIs; and (6) to 
firewall OTIs’ competitively sensitive 
information from personnel involved 
in Google’s travel search service. 
2010 In re 
Coca- Cola 
Co.18 
The Coca-Cola Co. (“Coke”) proposed to acquire its 
largest bottler, Coca-Cola Enterprises (“CCE”), and an 
exclusive license to bottle and distribute all Dr. Pepper 
Snapple Group (“Dr Pepper”) brands that CCE formerly 
distributed. The FTC alleged that to carry out distribution 
activities, Coke would have access to Dr Pepper’s 
commercially sensitive information and could misuse that 
information to exclude competitors or to facilitate 
collusion. 
Misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange 
Consent Decree limited access to Dr 
Pepper’s commercially sensitive 
information to Coke employees who 
perform traditional bottler functions. 
 
 
 11 
 
 In re PepsiCo, 
Inc.19 
PepsiCo, Inc. proposed to acquire two of its 
bottler/distributor companies and an exclusive license 
from Dr. Pepper Snapple Group (“Dr Pepper”) to bottle, 
distribute and sell brands in certain territories that these 
two companies formerly sold. The FTC alleged that to 
carry out distribution activities, Pepsi would have access 
to Dr Pepper’s commercially sensitive information and 
could misuse that information to exclude competitors or to 
facilitate collusion. 
Misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange 
Consent Decree limited access to Dr 
Pepper’s commercially sensitive 
information to Pepsi employees who 
perform traditional bottler functions. 
 United States 
v. 
Ticketmaster 
Entm’t, Inc.20 
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., the largest U.S. primary 
ticketing company, proposed to merge with Live Nation, 
Inc., the largest concert promoter in the U.S. and the 
owner of multiple concert venues. Before the merger, Live 
Nation had licensed primary-ticketing technology from 
CTS Eventim AG (“CTS”) and secured contracts with 
venues representing 15% of major concert venue 
capacity. The DOJ alleged a horizontal loss of competition 
and potential competition for primary ticketing services 
and vertical theories that the merger would eliminate Live 
Nation and Ticketmaster as facilitators of entry into one 
another’s primary markets and that the merger would 
allow Live Nation and Ticketmaster to exclude competitors 
by bundling primary ticketing services with access to 
artists promoted by Live Nation. The DOJ rejected claims 
that the merger would eliminate double marginalization as 
not merger specific, because the firms were already in the 
process of becoming vertically integrated themselves. 
Merging 
firms as 
potential 
entrants; 
merging 
firms as 
entry 
facilitators; 
complement
-ary product 
foreclosure 
The DOJ required Ticketmaster (1) 
to license its platform software used 
to sell tickets to Anschutz 
Entertainment Group, Inc. (“AEG”) 
and give AEG the option to acquire a 
copy of the source code after four 
years; (2) to not ticket AEG venues 
after four years to incent AEG to 
take that option; and (3) to divest its 
Paciolan “self-ticketing” platform to 
Comcast-Spectator, L.P. 
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2008 In re 
Fresenius 
Medical Care 
AG & Co 
KGaA21 
Fresenius Medical Care Ag & Co. KGaA, a provider of 
dialysis services and owner of dialysis clinics, proposed to 
acquire an exclusive sublicense from Daiichi Sankyo 
Company to manufacture and supply Venofer, an iron 
deficiency treatment for dialysis patients, to independent 
outpatient dialysis clinics in the U.S. The FTC alleged that 
Fresenius could inflate its Medicare reimbursements by 
increasing the prices it charged in its own clinics. 
Revisions to Medicare reimbursement regulations taking 
effect in 2012 would eliminate this distortion. 
Evasion of 
regulation 
Consent Decree required Fresenius 
to report an intra-company transfer 
price below the level set by the FTC, 
which was derived from current 
market prices, until the revised 
regulations took effect. 
2007 United States 
v. Monsanto 
Co.22 
Monsanto Co., a leading provider of in-cottonseed traits, 
proposed to acquire Delta and Pine Land Co. (“DPL”), a 
large supplier of “traited cottonseed” that worked with 
biotech companies to develop cotton seed traits. 
Monsanto and DPL originally partnered to develop the 
most commonly used “traited cottonseed,” with Monsanto 
developing the traits and DPL manufacturing the seeds 
and paying a license fee to Monsanto. Before the merger, 
DPL had begun an effort to replace Monsanto traits in 
DPL cottonseed with similar traits developed by 
competitors of Monsanto. Monsanto had in turn begun an 
effort to manufacture cottenseeds by acquiring Stoneville 
Pedigree Seed Company (“Stoneville”), a competitor of 
DPL. The DOJ challenged the merger, alleging a 
horizontal loss of competition between DPL and Stoneville 
and a vertical theory that DPL would refuse to partner with 
other developers of cottonseed traits that would compete 
against Monsanto’s traits. 
Merging 
firms as 
entry 
facilitators; 
customer 
foreclosure 
Final Judgment required the merged 
entity to divest certain promising 
cottonseed development lines, trait 
technology, and forty DPL 
cottonseed breeding lines, and to 
modify Monsanto’s seed company 
licenses. 
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 In re 
Lockheed 
Martin Corp.23 
Boeing Corp., a global aerospace company and supplier 
to the Department of Defense, and Lockheed Martin 
Corp., the largest defense contractor in the U.S., were 
competing providers of medium-to-heavy (“MTH”) launch 
services and of space vehicles. They proposed to form a 
joint venture to consolidate their government 
launch-service and space- vehicle businesses. The FTC 
alleged that the JV could refuse to provide launch 
services to competing space vehicle providers, in 
particular for packaged price procurement of the two 
services known as “delivery in orbit.” Additionally, the FTC 
alleged that the companies might share confidential 
information obtained through launch vehicle services with 
their respective space vehicle businesses, and vice-versa. 
The FTC also alleged that the transaction would lead to a 
horizontal loss of competition between the merging firms’ 
MTH launch services and space vehicles, but accepted 
the Department of Defense’s finding that the increased 
launch reliability would outweigh these effects. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required (1) the JV 
to cooperate on equal terms with all 
providers of government space 
vehicles; (2) Boeing and Lockheed 
to equally consider the JV’s launch 
service competitors in government 
delivery in orbit procurement; and (3) 
the JV, Boeing, and Lockheed to 
establish firewalls to prevent access 
to one another’s or third firms’ 
confidential information. 
2003 United States 
v. Northrop 
Grumman 
Corp.24 
Northrop Grumman Corp., one of two suppliers of certain 
payloads for reconnaissance satellite programs, proposed 
to acquire TRW, Inc., a company with the ability to act as 
a prime contractor on reconnaissance satellite programs 
that use these products. The DOJ alleged the company 
could deny competitors access to its prime contractor or 
payload capabilities. Additionally, it would provide the 
entity access to proprietary information of rival prime and 
payload suppliers contracting with Northrop. 
Complemen
-tary 
products 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Final Judgment required Northrop 
(1) to select payloads on a 
non-discriminatory basis when it had 
already been selected as the prime 
contractor; and (2) to offer its 
payloads to all competing prime 
contractors on a non-discriminatory 
basis when it was competing to be 
the prime contractor. 
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2002 In re Cytyc 
Corp.25 
Cytyc Corp., a manufacturer of liquid-based pap smear 
tests for cervical cancer, proposed to acquire Digene 
Corp., the only seller of a DNA-based test for human 
papillomavirus (“HPV”). Doctors conducted HPV tests 
from the sample obtained by the liquid-based pap smear. 
The FTC alleged that Cytyc could foreclose its pap smear 
competitors by limiting access to Digene’s HPV test. The 
FTC also alleged that the merger would eliminate 
Digene’s incentive to continue pursuing FDA approval for 
its HPV test to be used as a primary cervical cancer 
screen in place of liquid-based pap smears. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
merging 
firms as 
potential 
entrants 
Transaction abandoned. 
2001 United States 
v. Premdor 
Inc.26 
Premdor Inc., the largest global manufacturer of interior 
molded doors and a small producer of molded door skins, 
proposed to acquire Masonite Corp., a manufacturer of 
molded door skins and fiberboard, the primary input for 
molded door skins. Premdor had recently entered the 
production of molded door skins and, although it was 
relatively small, had used its potential to expand to 
negotiate discounts from Masonite. The DOJ alleged a 
horizontal loss of competition in the sale of molded door 
skins and vertical theories that the elimination of the threat 
of Premdor’s expansion in molded door skins allowed 
enhanced coordination upstream and downstream and 
that the merger would lead to lower costs and greater cost 
symmetry between the merged firm and another vertically 
integrated firm, making collusion more likely. 
Merging 
firms as 
potential 
entrants; 
elimination 
of disruptive 
buyer; 
collusive 
information 
exchange; 
using lower 
costs to 
facilitate 
consensus 
or to 
increase the 
ability to 
punish 
defectors 
Final Judgment required Premdor to 
divest its Towanda facility, which 
engaged in the production of molded 
door skins, creating a new upstream 
competitor. 
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 In re Entergy 
Corporation 
and Entergy-  
Koch, LP27 
Entergy Corporation, a generator, transmitter, and 
distributor of electricity, proposed to form a joint venture 
with Entergy- Koch, LP with Koch Industries, Inc., which 
owned an electricity derivatives trading company and the 
Gulf South pipeline. The JV would combine Entergy’s 
subsidiary that markets electricity and gas with Koch 
Industries’ electricity derivatives trading company and the 
Gulf South pipeline. The FTC alleged that, as a result of 
Entergy’s exclusive legal right to sell electricity in 
Louisiana and Mississippi and recover 100% of the costs 
from those states’ electricity producers and the 
acquisition, Entergy would have the incentive to purchase 
gas transportation services from the Gulf South pipeline at 
an inflated price. 
Evasion of 
regulation 
Consent Decree required Entergy to 
establish a competitive bidding 
process for its sourcing of gas 
transportation services. 
2000 In re Ceridian 
Corp.28 
Ceridian Corp., a provider of fleet-card services to 
over-the- road trucking companies, acquired Trendar 
Corp, a provider of fuel purchase desk automation 
systems used to process fleet card transactions. The FTC 
alleged that Ceridian could deny rival fleet-card services 
access to Trendar’s system or grant access to them only 
on discriminatory terms. The FTC also alleged that 
Ceridian could deny rival fuel purchase desk automation 
systems the ability to process Ceridian cards. (The FTC 
learned of the non-reportable acquisition of Trendar 
during Ceridian’s 1998 acquisition of a competing provider 
of fleet card services, which the FTC also challenged.) 
Merging 
firms as 
entry 
facilitators; 
input 
foreclosure; 
customer 
foreclosure 
Consent Order required Ceridian (1) 
to provide ten-year licenses to 
Trendar fuel purchase desk 
automation systems to rival 
fleet-card providers; (2) to pay for a 
third-party software developer of the 
Commission’s choice to implement 
interoperability between Trendar’s 
system and rival fleet-card providers’ 
networks; and (3) to provide ten-year 
licenses to rival fuel purchaser desk 
automation system suppliers to 
process Ceridian’s fleet cards on the 
same terms as Trendar systems 
were able to process Ceridian fleet 
cards. 
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 In re America 
Online, Inc.29 
America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), a global narrowband and 
broadband internet service provider (“ISP”), proposed to 
merge with Time Warner Inc., a cable television distributor 
and broadband ISP. Before the merger, AOL had recently 
launched AOL TV, a first-generation interactive television 
(“ITV”) service delivered through local cable providers. 
The FTC alleged a horizontal loss of competition between 
AOL and Time Warner in broadband internet access and 
vertical theories that the combined firm would have the 
ability and incentive to block or deter rival ITV providers 
from competing with AOL TV through its cable system. 
Additionally, the FTC was concerned that the merged 
entity would foreclose competing ISPs from providing 
cable broadband ISP service on Time Warner’s cable 
system. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
customer 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required the 
merged firm (1) to not make AOL 
broadband available in a cable 
service area until Earthlink, a 
competitor, was able to offer cable 
internet service in that area; (2) to 
enter agreements to carry two other 
non-affiliated cable ISPs in that area 
within 90 days of offering AOL 
broadband service; (3) to not 
interfere the ability of a subscriber to 
access competing ITV services; and 
(4) to charge a comparable price for 
AOL DSL service in Time Warner 
Service areas as outside those 
areas. 
 In re Boeing 
Company30 
Boeing Company, a supplier of launch vehicles and a 
contractor bidding for a certain classified Department of 
Defense classified program, proposed to acquire certain 
space-related assets of General Motors Corporation, 
including satellite production and a systems engineering 
and technical assistance (“SETA”) for a certain classified 
Department of Defense program. The FTC alleged that 
Boeing would (1) use its position as the SETA contractor 
for the classified program to favor its own bid or to obtain 
competitively sensitive information about competitors’ 
bids; (2) access rival satellite producers’ competitively 
sensitive information through its launch vehicle business; 
(3) access rival launch vehicle providers’ competitively 
sensitive information through its satellite business; and (4) 
withhold satellite interface information necessary to use 
Boeing’s satellites with competing launch vehicles. 
Customer 
foreclosure; 
complement
ary products 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required Boeing (1) 
to firewall competitively sensitive 
information of rival bidders it 
received in its capacity as a SETA 
contractor; (2) to provider certain 
documentation and transition 
services to the Department of 
Defense to enable it to transition 
SETA for the program away from 
Boeing; (3) to firewall competitively 
sensitive information of satellite 
rivals’ obtained through Boeing’s 
launch services; and (4) to provide 
certain interface information for its 
satellites to rival launch services 
providers. 
 17 
 
 United States 
v. Enova 
Corp.31 
Enova Corp., an electric utility provider in San Diego, and 
Pacific Enterprises, a major provider of natural gas 
transportation services to gas-fired plants and of natural 
gas storage in California, proposed to merge. The DOJ 
alleged that the Pacific would have the ability and 
incentive following the merger to deny access to or raise 
the price of its natural gas transportation services for rival 
electricity producers. California regulations establishing 
marginal-unit pricing for all electricity would magnify this 
effect. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Final Judgment required the merged 
firm to divest all low-cost gas 
generators that would likely provide 
the firm with the incentive to raise 
electricity prices. It allowed Enova to 
keep higher-cost generators 
because these would be active 
insufficiently frequently for a 
downstream increase in price to 
outweigh an upstream loss of sales. 
1999 In re Barnes & 
Noble, Inc. 
and Ingram 
Book Group32 
Barnes and Noble, Inc. (“B&N”), a book retailer, proposed 
to merge with Ingram Book Group, a book wholesaler. 
Before the transaction, B&N had announced publicly that 
it considered providing wholesale services to retailers. 
The FTC alleged a horizontal loss of potential competition 
in book wholesaling and vertical theory that B&N could 
restrict access or raise prices of books to competing 
retailers. The FTC also alleged that B&N would could gain 
access to rivals’ competitively sensitive information 
through Ingram which could allow it to preempt rivals’ 
competitive efforts. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
elimination 
of potential 
competition; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Transaction abandoned. 
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 In re 
Provident 
Companies33 
Provident Companies, Inc. and UNUM Corporation, both 
providers of insurance for individual disability policies, 
proposed to merge. It was common practice in the 
industry for insurers to supply one another with actuarial 
data through an industry association to assist in 
determining the risk of individuals for particular injuries. 
The FTC alleged that the combined firm would no longer 
have the incentive to provide this data to rivals, as it would 
have sufficient scale that the competitive harm to rivals 
would outweigh the reduction in its own ability to assess 
its insureds’ risk. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required the 
merged firm to provide its actuarial 
data to rivals through an industry 
association for 20 years. 
 In re Merck & 
Co, Inc.34 
Merck & Co., a pharmaceutical manufacturer, acquired 
Medco Manage Care, L.L.C. in 1993, a provider of 
pharmacy benefit management (“PBM”) services. The 
FTC alleged that Merck could (1) foreclose rival 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from Medco’s drug 
formulary; (2) Merck would have access to competitors’ 
proprietary information through the PBM services; and (3) 
Medco would be eliminated as an independent, disruptive 
negotiator with pharmaceutical companies. 
Customer 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange; 
elimination 
of a 
disruptive 
buyer. 
Consent Decree required Merck: (1) 
to establish an independent 
Pharmacy and Therapeutics 
committee to determine which drugs 
would qualify for an “open formulary” 
it was required to maintain; (2) to 
accept all discounts offered by other 
drug manufacturers on the open 
formulary and reflect those discounts 
in their products’ ranking on the 
open formulary; and (3) to firewall 
from Merck and Medco the 
competitively sensitive information of 
the other’s rivals. 
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 In re CMS 
Energy 
Corporation35 
CMS Energy Corporation (“CMS”), which owned a 
combination electric and gas utility serving broad sections 
of Michigan, proposed to acquire the Panhandle Eastern 
and Trunkline pipelines from Duke Energy. Before the 
merger, CMS had natural gas interconnections with other 
rival pipelines. The FTC alleged that CMS would have an 
incentive to close its interconnection or reduce its 
interconnection capacity available to other pipelines, 
increasing demand on the Panhandle Eastern and 
Trunkline pipelines and enabling them to raise their rates. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required CMS (1) to 
maintain a designated level of 
interconnection capacity based on 
historical usage levels; and (2) offer 
shippers the ability to break 
contracts and interconnect with 
another pipeline or to tap CMS’s 
own account to supply gas if the 
available interconnection capacity is 
less than actual capacity. 
 United States 
v. SBC 
Comm’ns 
Inc.36 
SBC Communications, Inc. (“SBC”), a provider of local 
exchange, long distance, and wireless mobile telephone 
services, proposed to acquire Ameritech Corporation, a 
provider of wireless mobile telephone services. Before the 
merger, Ameritech had planned to enter the provision of 
local exchange and long distance services in a bundle 
with Ameritech’s wireless service in St. Louis. The DOJ 
alleged that, as a result of the acquisition, Ameritech 
would no longer have the incentive to offer a bundle of 
Ameritech’s wireless services with the local exchange and 
long-distance services in competition with SBC. The DOJ 
also alleged a horizontal loss of competition in markets 
where both SBC and Ameritech provided wireless service. 
Merging 
firms as 
potential 
entrants; 
complement
ary product 
foreclosure 
Final Judgment required SBC to 
divest its cellular business and all 
assets involved in its planned entry 
into St. Louis, as well as assets to 
eliminate the horizontal overlaps. 
 In re 
Dominion 
Resources, 
Inc.37 
Dominion Resources, Inc., an electricity provider, 
proposed to acquire Consolidated Natural Gas Co., a 
distributor of natural gas, one of the fuels used to 
generate electricity. The FTC alleged that Dominion could 
use its control over the available source of natural gas 
and transportation capacity in the area to limit or deter 
independent producers from generating electricity. 
Merging 
firms as 
entry 
facilitators; 
input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required the 
divestiture of Consolidated 
subsidiary, Virginia Natural Gas, 
Inc., which provided gas distribution 
services. 
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1998 United States 
v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp.38 
Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop Grumman Corp., 
both integrated defense contractors, proposed to merge. 
The DOJ alleged that the acquisition would give Lockheed 
control over all of Northrop’s military platforms, prime 
contracts, and capabilities in critical systems and 
subsystems, providing it with the incentive to refuse to 
sell, sell inferior quality, or sell on unfavorable terms these 
systems to its integrated electronics system competitors, 
and that Northrop’s systems engineering and technical 
assistance services contracts would give Lockheed 
access to competitors’ sensitive information. The DOJ 
also alleged horizontal theories of harm in other markets. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Transaction abandoned. 
 In re 
PacificCorp39 
PacifiCorp, a provider of retail electricity in seven states 
and of wholesale electricity in others, proposed to acquire 
The Energy Group PLC (“TEG”), which owned Peabody 
Coal Company, a coal-mine operator. TEG supplied coal 
to the Navajo and Mojave Generating Stations, which 
competed with PacifiCorp’s generating assets in the 
Western Systems Coordinating Council, an electricity 
pool. The FTC alleged that PacifiCorp would have an 
incentive (1) to manipulate the costs of its coal to affect 
the contract prices to Navajo and Mojave Generating 
Stations and refrain from offering them discounts if the 
coal price were to fall or if its mines were to have excess 
capacity; and (2) to access competitively sensitive 
information about the costs of competitors using its coal. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required PacifiCorp 
to divest Peabody Western Coal 
Company, the subsidiary owning the 
mines that supplied competitors. The 
transaction was abandoned for 
unrelated reasons. 
 
 
 21 
 
 United States 
v. Primestar, 
Inc.40 
Primestar, Inc., an investment entity controlled by five 
cable companies, proposed to acquire the satellite assets 
of MCI Communications Corp., The News Corporation 
Limited, and K. Rupert Murdoch, which included the only 
orbital slot from which direct-broadcast service (“DBS”) 
video programming could be offered. The DOJ alleged 
that the acquisition would allow the cable companies to 
deny the orbital slot to their DBS competitors, preserving 
their cable monopolies. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Transaction abandoned. 
 In re TRW 
Inc.41 
TRW Inc. and BDM International Inc. proposed to merge. 
TRW was part of a joint venture competing for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization’s Lead Systems Integrator 
(“LSI”) contract while BDM was the sole supplier of 
systems engineering and technical assistance (“SETA”) 
services for the program. The FTC alleged that the 
acquisition would enable TRW to access its competitors’ 
competitively sensitive bidding information and that 
TRW’s SETA role would allow it to favor its own bids 
through the setting of procurement rules and evaluation of 
bids. 
Customer 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required TRW to 
divest BDM’s contract with the 
Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization for SETA services and 
all related assets. 
 In re Shell Oil 
Co.42 
Shell Oil Co. and Texaco, Inc. proposed to form a joint 
venture combining their various gasoline, fuel, and 
pipeline assets. Shell and another company made the 
majority of asphalt used in Northern California, and both 
bought the undiluted heavy crude used to make the 
asphalt from Texaco’s pipeline. The FTC alleged that the 
JV could raise the cost of crude for Shell’s competitor, 
leading to an increase in the price for asphalt. The FTC 
also alleged numerous horizontal theories of harm in other 
markets. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required the JV to 
enter into a ten-year supply 
agreement with Shell’s competitor 
for crude and to divest assets to 
remedy the horizontal overlaps. 
 22 
 
1997 In re Cadence 
Design 
Systems, 
Inc.43 
Cadence Design Systems, Inc. (“Cadence”), a leading 
supplier of integrated circuit layout environments, 
proposed to acquire Cooper & Chryan Technology, Inc. 
(“CCT”), a supplier of integrated circuit routing tools. The 
FTC alleged that the merger would reduce Cadence’s 
incentives to permit competing suppliers of routing tools to 
access its layout environments on the same terms as it 
allowed developers of tools which did not compete with 
CCT’s. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required Cadence 
to allow developers competing with 
CCT to participate in its software 
interface programs on the same 
terms as developers whose tools did 
not compete with CCT’s. 
 In re Time 
Warner, Inc.44 
Time Warner, Inc. (“TW”), a leading provider of cable 
program networks and cable multi-video program 
distributor (“MVPD”), proposed to acquire Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. (“Turner”), which owned 
several popular cable networks. The FTC alleged that TW 
would refuse to carry competitors of Turner’s CNN 
Network, such as Fox News or MSNBC, and would raise 
the price of TW and Turner cable programming to rival 
MVPDs. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
customer 
foreclosure 
Consent Decree required TW (1) to 
not bundle its own programming with 
Turner programming; (2) to offer 
Turner programming to rival MVPDs 
at its pre-merger price; and (3) to 
carry at least one rival network to 
CNN on TW’s cable systems. 
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 In re Boeing 
Company45 
Boeing Company, a manufacturer of high-altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, proposed to acquire 
the Aerospace and Defense Business of Rockwell 
International Corporation, which provided wing 
components to a rival manufacturer of high-altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. The FTC alleged 
that the acquisition would allow Boeing (1) to deny access 
to or degrade the quality of the wings provided to the rival 
manufacturer of high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial 
vehicles; and (2) to access competitively sensitive 
information about the rival manufacturer of high-altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required Boeing (1) 
to offer the rival manufacturer of 
high- altitude endurance unmanned 
aerial vehicles the ability to change 
to a different supplier of wing 
components and deliver the assets 
necessary to do so; and (2) to 
firewall the competitively sensitive 
information of the rival manufacturer 
of high-altitude endurance 
unmanned aerial vehicles obtained 
through supply of wing components. 
1996 In re 
Lockheed 
Martin 
Corporation46 
Lockheed Martin Corporation, one of the largest defense 
and space contractors in the U.S., proposed to acquire 
Loral Corporation, another defense and space contractor. 
The proposed acquisition affected several markets.  
Loral Corporation was the FAA’s systems engineering and 
technical services (“SETA”) contractor, a position in which 
it developed procurement specifications for the agency 
and assessed bids. Lockheed participated in many of the 
procurement auctions for which Loral was the SETA 
contractor. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would 
give Lockheed access to competitively sensitive 
information about competing bidders, as well as allow 
Lockheed to tailor procurement specifications or skew bid 
evaluations to raise its rivals’ costs. 
Loral was a supplier of critical components for tactical 
fighter aircraft. Lockheed was a manufacturer of tactical 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange 
Consent Decree required Lockheed 
Martin (1) to divest Loral’s SETA 
contract; (2) to firewall competitively 
sensitive information about tactical 
fighter manufacturers using Loral 
components; (3) to firewall 
competitively sensitive information 
about unmanned aerial vehicle 
manufacturers using Loral integrated 
communications systems; (4) to limit 
its ownership interest in Loral Space 
to 20%; (5) to not provide any 
personnel, information, or facilities to 
Loral Space under the technical 
services agreement; and (6) to not 
share board members or officers 
with Loral Space and not 
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fighter aircraft. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would 
give Lockheed access to competitively sensitive 
information about its competitors who used Loral’s 
components. 
Loral was a supplier of integrated communications 
systems for unmanned aerial vehicles. Lockheed was a 
manufacturer of unmanned aerial vehicles. The FTC 
alleged that the acquisition would give Lockheed access 
to competitively sensitive information about its competitors 
who used Loral’s integrated communications’ systems. 
As part of the acquisition, Loral’s space and 
telecommunications business would be transferred to a 
new entity (Loral Space) in which Lockheed Martin would 
obtain a 20% convertible preferred equity interest, and 
under which Lockheed Martin would provide technical 
services including R&D to Loral Space. The FTC also 
alleged a horizontal loss of competition between 
Lockheed Martin and Loral Space in commercial 
low-Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit satellites, both 
from enhanced coordination and unilateral effects from 
the partial ownership interest. 
compensate any Lockheed Martin 
officer or board member based on 
the profits of Loral Space. 
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 United States 
v. The 
Thomson 
Corp.47 
Thomson Corp., the world’s largest publisher of 
information for professional markets, proposed to acquire 
West Publishing Co., the largest publisher of legal 
research materials in the U.S. Thomson licensed primary 
and secondary law materials as well as additional 
services (such as an electronic citator) to West’s primary 
competitor in comprehensive online legal research 
services, Lexis-Nexis. The DOJ alleged that the 
acquisition would increase Thomson’s incentive and 
ability to increase the prices of, reduce the quality of, or 
refuse access to Thomson materials it provides to 
Lexis-Nexis. The DOJ also alleged horizontal theories of 
harm in certain enhanced primary law products and 
secondary law materials. 
Input 
foreclosure 
Final Judgment required Thomson to 
divest the electronic citator it 
provided to Lexis and to extend 
terms of existing database licenses 
to Lexis and to divest assets to 
remedy the horizontal overlaps. 
 In re 
Raytheon 
Company48 
Raytheon Company, a prime contractor bidding for the 
U.S. Navy’s Submarine High Data Rate Satellite 
Communications Terminal, proposed to acquire Chrysler 
Technologies Holding, Inc. (“CTH”), a provider of antenna 
and terminal controls that were an input into Submarine 
High Data Rate Satellite Communications Terminals. 
Before the merger, CTH had joined the bidding team for 
GTE Corporation, a prime contractor competing with 
Raytheon. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would 
allow Raytheon and GTE to use CTH as a vehicle to 
exchange competitively sensitive information. 
Collusive 
information 
exchange 
Consent Decree required Raytheon 
to firewall Raytheon’s and GTE’s 
competitively sensitive information 
from being exchanged through CTH. 
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 In re Hughes 
Danbury 
Optical 
Systems, 
Inc.49 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems (“HDOS”), a producer 
of adaptive optics systems, proposed to acquire Itek 
Optical Systems Division of Litton Industries, Inc., a 
producer of deformable mirrors. There were two teams 
developing the adaptive optics system, which required 
deformable mirrors, for the U.S. Air Force’s Airborne 
Laser (“ABL”) program; HDOS was part of the “Rockwell 
team” while Itek was part of the “Boeing team.” Xinetics 
Inc., another producer of deformable mirrors, had an 
exclusive contract with HDOS. The FTC alleged that 
HDOS could (1) foreclose the Boeing team from access to 
Itek or Xinetics deformable mirrors; and (2) gain access to 
competitively sensitive information of the Boeing team 
through Itek. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required HDOS (1) 
to not enforce the exclusivity 
provisions with Xinetics Inc. for the 
ABL program; and (2) to firewall 
competitively sensitive information 
Itek received as a member of the 
Boeing team. 
1995 In re Silicon 
Graphics, 
Inc.50 
Silicon Graphics, Inc. (“SGI”), a supplier of entertainment 
graphics workstations, proposed to acquire Alias 
Research Inc. (“Alias”). and Wavefront Technology Inc. 
(“Wavefront”), two developers of entertainment graphics 
software. The FTC alleged that the new entity could 
foreclose rival workstation producers from accessing 
critical entertainment graphics software and could 
foreclose competing entertainment graphics companies 
from developing software compatible with SGI’s 
workstations. Additionally, Silicon could access 
competitively sensitive information related to other 
workstation producers through their use of Alias or 
Wavefront entertainment graphics software. 
Complemen
tary 
products 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required SGI (1) to 
enter an agreement with a rival 
workstation provider to port Alias’s 
and Wavefront’s entertainment 
graphics software to the rivals’ 
systems; (2) to maintain an open 
architecture for SGI systems and 
publish SGI systems’ application 
programming interfaces; and (3) to 
maintain a software development 
program for rivals of Alias and 
Wavefront with similar terms to 
those used for other development 
programs. 
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 In re Alliant 
Techsystems 
Inc.51 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. (“Alliant”), a manufacturer of 
ammunition and munitions, proposed to acquire Hercules 
Incorporated’s aerospace division, a supplier of propellant 
used in large caliber ammunition. The FTC alleged that 
Alliant would gain access to competitors’ confidential 
information regarding munitions through its role as a 
supplier of propellant. 
Misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange 
Consent Decree required Alliant to 
firewall competitively sensitive 
information gained through Alliant’s 
capacity as a propellant provider. 
 United States 
v. Sprint 
Corp.52 
Sprint Corp., France Telecom (“FT”), and Deutsche 
Telekom (“DT”) proposed to form a joint venture for 
international telecommunication services. Additionally, FT 
and DT agreed to acquire 20% of voting equity in Sprint. 
The DOJ alleged that the JV could: (1) restrict competitors 
from accessing French and German public switched 
networks, infrastructure, and public data networks 
controlled by FT and DT; (2) deny operating agreements 
for a correspondent system in France and Germany to 
competitors of the JV, which were necessary for 
telecommunications traffic; and (3) obtain confidential 
information from other U.S. carriers through the Sprint 
ownership and JV participation. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange 
Final Judgment required (1) FT and 
DT to make services available to 
competitors of the JV on a 
non-discriminatory basis; (2) Sprint 
to forego providing correspondent 
telecommunication services with 
France or Germany unless another 
provider has an operating 
agreement; (3) Sprint to disclose 
certain information about its 
agreements with DT and FT; and (4) 
FT and DT to firewall Sprint and the 
JV from competitively sensitive 
information of Sprint’s rivals. The 
Final Judgment also imposed certain 
additional restrictions until 
facilities-based competition with FT 
and DT were legalized in their home 
countries. 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 In re Eli Lilly & 
Co., Inc.53 
Eli Lilly and Co., a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, 
proposed to acquire McKesson, Inc., which through its 
PCS Health Systems, Inc. (“PCS”) subsidiary provided 
pharmacy benefit management (“PBM”) services. As part 
of its PBM services, PCS maintained a drug formulary, 
which included several of Eli’s Lilly’s drugs. The FTC 
alleged that (1) competing manufacturer’s drugs would 
likely be foreclosed from the PCS formulary; (2) Eli Lilly 
would have access to competitors’ proprietary information 
through the PBM services; and (3) PCS would be 
eliminated as an independent negotiator of 
pharmaceutical prices. 
Customer 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange; 
elimination 
of disruptive 
buyer. 
Consent Decree required Eli Lilly (1) 
to maintain an open formulary 
implemented by an independent 
committee and to reflect all 
discounts and rebates offered by 
other drug manufacturers on the 
open formulary; (2) to firewall Lilly’s 
competitively sensitive information 
from being released to Lilly 
competitors through PCS; (3) to 
firewall PCS’s confidential 
information from being released to 
PCS competitors through Lilly. 
 In re 
Lockheed 
Corp. and 
Martin 
Marietta 
Corp.54 
Lockheed Corp., a manufacturer of military aircraft, and 
Martin Marietta Corp., a supplier of an infrared navigation 
and targeting system (“LANTIRN”) for military aircraft, 
proposed to merge. The FTC alleged that (1) the 
company could modify Martin Marietta’s LANTIRN 
systems to raise the costs of competing military aircraft; 
and (2) Lockheed’s military aircraft division could access 
rival military aircraft manufacturers’ sensitive information 
shared with Martin Marietta to use its LANTIRN system. 
The FTC also alleged horizontal losses of competition in 
the development of expendable launch vehicles, in 
satellites for use in space- based early warning systems, 
and in certain sensors. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required the 
merged firm (1) to not modify the 
LANTIRN system in a way that 
discriminated against rival aircraft 
manufacturers unless necessary; (2) 
to firewall competitively sensitive 
information from military aircraft 
competitors obtained by Martin 
Marietta as part of their use of the 
LANTIRN system; and (3) to refrain 
from enforcing certain teaming 
agreements to remove the horizontal 
overlaps. 
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1994 In re Martin 
Marietta 
Corp.55 
Martin Marietta Corp., a manufacturer of satellites, 
proposed to acquire General Dynamics Corp.’s Space 
Systems Division, which produced expendable launch 
vehicles. The FTC alleged that Martin Marietta could 
access confidential information of competing satellite 
suppliers through its role as a provider of expendable 
launch vehicles. 
Misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Consent Decree required Martin 
Marietta to firewall competitively 
sensitive information of rival satellite 
producers obtained in its role as a 
provider of expendable launch 
vehicles. 
 United States 
v. AT&T56 
AT&T Corp., the largest U.S. long distance telephone 
company and a provider of cellular infrastructure 
equipment, proposed to acquire McCaw Cellular 
Communications, the largest cellular carrier. The DOJ 
alleged that (1) AT&T would limit access to or raise the 
price of its cellular infrastructure equipment to networks 
competing with McCaw’s; (2) McCaw could gain access to 
its competitors’ competitively sensitive information through 
their use of AT&T equipment; (3) AT&T could gain access 
to its competitors’ competitively sensitive information 
through McCaw’s use of their equipment; and (4) McCaw 
could steer its customers to using AT&T’s interexchange 
services, eliminating competition between AT&T and rival 
interexchange service providers. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
customer 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information 
Final Judgment required AT&T (1) to 
provide equal access to 
interexchange competitors of AT&T; 
(2) to firewall competitively sensitive 
information McCaw obtained from 
competing cellular infrastructure 
equipment providers; (3) to firewall 
competitively sensitive information 
AT&T obtain from competing cellular 
carriers; and (4) to continue to deal 
with cellular infrastructure equipment 
customers on current terms and on 
terms equal to those provided to 
McCaw. 
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 United States 
v. MCI 
Commc’ns 
Corp.57 
British Telecommunications plc. (“BT”) proposed to 
acquire 20% interest in MCI Communications Corp. and to 
form a joint venture for global telecommunication services. 
Global telecommunications services were provided on a 
“correspondent” basis, in which providers completed each 
other’s traffic. The DOJ alleged that: (1) BT could use 
pricing or contract terms to favor MCI for international 
correspondence services; (2) MCI could gain access to 
competitors’ competitively sensitive information through 
their relationships with BT; and (3) BT could send all or 
most of its international switch traffic to MCI. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
customer 
foreclosure; 
misuse of 
competitors’ 
sensitive 
information; 
collusive 
information 
exchange 
Final Judgment required BT (1) to 
follow transparency and disclosure 
requirements for telecommunication 
services between BT and MCI; and 
(2) to firewall competitively sensitive 
information from MCI’s competitors 
obtained through BT’s 
correspondent services. 
 United States 
v. Tele-  
Commc’ns 
Inc.58 
Tele-Communications, Inc. (“TCI”) and Liberty Media 
Corp. (“Liberty”), both large cable multichannel 
subscription television distributors (“MSTDs”) that had 
interests in video programming networks, proposed to 
merge. Before the merger, the firms had substantial 
cross-ownership and cooperated closely. The DOJ 
alleged that, although their cross-ownership and differing 
service areas had already eliminated horizontal 
competition, the merger would (1) give each company the 
incentive to deny or make more expensive to rival video 
programming networks carriage on their cable systems; 
and (2) give each company the incentive to deny or make 
more expensive to rival MSTDs the programming from 
their video programming networks. 
Input 
foreclosure; 
customer 
foreclosure 
Final Judgment required the merged 
firm (1) to not discriminate in 
providing carriage on its cable 
systems to rival video programming 
networks, where the effect would be 
to unreasonably restrain 
competition; and (2) to not 
discriminate in providing its video 
programming services to rival 
MSTDs, where the effect would be 
to unreasonably restrain 
competition. 
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